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Leibniz’s metaphysical views were not known to most of his 
correspondents, let alone to the larger public, until 1695 when he published 
an article in Journal des savants, titled in English “A New System of the 
Nature and Communication of Substances, and of the Union of the Soul and 
Body” (henceforth New System).1 The article raised quite a stir. Perhaps the 
most interesting and cunning critique of Leibniz’s views was provided by a 
French refugee in Rotterdam, Pierre Bayle (1647−1706) who is most 
famous for his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1697). The fascinating 
controversy on Leibniz’s idea of pre-established harmony and a number of 
other topics lasted for five years and ended only when Bayle died. In this 
paper I will give an overview of the communication, discuss in detail a 
central topic concerning spontaneity or a sudden change in the soul, and 
compare the views presented in the communication to Leibniz’s reflections 
in his partly concurrent New Essays on Human Understanding (1704) 
(henceforth NE). I will also reflect on whether the controversy could have 
ended in agreement if it would have continued longer.  
The New System  
 
Let us begin with the article that started the controversy, the New System. 
The article starts with Leibniz’s objection to the Cartesian doctrine of 
extension as a basic way of explaining motion. Instead, one should adopt a 
doctrine of force which belongs to the sphere of metaphysics (GP IV 478). 
This is because one cannot find the principle of unity in mere matter, as 
	
	
material things cannot be at the same time material and perfectly indivisible. 
Leibniz combined his new theory of forces or dynamics with the old 
scholastic doctrine of substantial forms, arguing that their nature consists in 
force in the sense that from it follows something analogous to feeling and 
desire which relates them to souls.2 To put these together, substantial forms 
are, in a sense, souls which contain not only actuality or the fulfilment of 
possibility, but also an originating activity which Leibniz calls primary force 
(GP IV, 479). 
According to Leibniz, the difference between minds and 
bodies is of kind rather than degree. Bodies or natural machines are 
machines, whatever change occurs in them (such as a caterpillar turning into 
a butterfly); whereas rational souls are above the changes in nature, as they 
are images of God. They possess unities, the ability to say “I”, which is 
never possible for machines of nature, even for animals (GP IV, 481−483). 
Thus spiritual machines are real unities with self-consciousness and moral 
identity; that is, they can systematically strive for happiness and perfection.    
In the second part of the article Leibniz strives to show how 
these two kinds of machines work together. His explanation is founded on 
his doctrine of pre-established harmony, which God created with the 
substances, determining by an single act the relations between the 
substances, including the human soul and the aggregate that is its body. 
Leibniz also gives a lucid formulation of a spiritual automaton: a substance 
with an active principle (primitive force), reason (self-consciousness, will to 
good) and spontaneity (freedom). It strives automatically to the good, but is 
nevertheless free as it possesses intelligence and spontaneity. In addition, 
the representations of the substance are fairly accurate, and this is the reason 
	
	
why it is able to strive to perfection in imitation of its creator, God (GP IV 
486). 
There were quite a number of critics of the New System, but I 
will here limit myself to Pierre Bayle (1647−1706), arguably the sharpest of 
them all. Bayle was a professor of history and philosophy in Rotterdam and 
was known primarily for his Dictionnaire historique et critique and his 
journal Nouvelles de la république des lettres. Leibniz’s discussion with 
Bayle was very important and led partly to his only published work 
Theodicy (1710). The communication started when Bayle added an 
extensive footnote H to the article “Rorarius” in the first edition of his 
Dictionnaire (1697). Leibniz’s response was published in Histoire des 
ouvrages des savants in 1698, but Bayle’s reflections did not appear until 
1702 when the second edition of the Dictionnaire was published (WF 
68−69). Naturally Leibniz was very eager to read the edition once it was 
published and very quickly he wrote a reply to Bayle, choosing not to 
publish it despite Bayle’s wish for him to do that. The reply was not 
published until 1716 in another journal called Histoire critique de 
République des lettres. Thus the discussion on New System took a very long 
time. In addition, Leibniz was privately busy reflecting Bayle’s and others 
comments and several drafts of replies and letters were left unfinished. Thus 
there are several versions of letters he sent and did not send to Bayle and 
also his private notes on the article “Rorarius” (WF 69-70).3 
Note H of “Rorarius” 
Let us start with the footnote H to “Rorarius”, where Bayle presented a 
counter-example to Leibniz’s pre-established harmony between the mind 
and the body. He asks how a dog’s soul can operate independently of its 
body if there is no direct interaction between them. If a dog is thought to be 
	
	
more than a mere physical machine, a sort of intermediate level between 
machines of nature and spiritual machines, one would suppose that it has 
some sort of spontaneity, freedom to do what it chooses to do. Therefore 
Bayle cannot understand the series of spontaneous internal actions which 
could make a dog’s soul feel pain immediately after having felt pleasure 
even if there was nothing else in the world (Bayle 1697: 697): 
I can understand why a dog passes immediately from pleasure 
to pain when, whilst it is very hungry and eating some bread, it 
is suddenly hit with a stick; but that its soul should be 
constructed in such a way that it would have felt pain at the 
moment that it was hit, even if it had not been hit, and even if 
it had continued to eat the bread without being disturbed or 
prevented, that is what I cannot understand (Bayle 1697: 697; 
WF 73-74).  
Bayle argues that according to Leibniz’s views, the dog would feel pain 
even if there is no cause for it because the state of pain is “programmed” in 
its substantial form. Related to this question is the relationship between 
spontaneity and negative feelings. If we suppose that the soul has 
spontaneity or activity, how can it feel passivity or negative feelings such as 
pain? (Bayle 1697: 697). The assumption behind Bayle’s argument is 
clearly that the natural continuation from pleasure is toward more pleasure 
and that a sudden change in the body would not necessarily take place in the 
soul at all (see also Rutherford 2005: 170). It is also evident, as Pelletier 
notes (2015: 165 & 170), that Bayle’s take on spontaneity here is related to 
external factors, which was the common received view of the time; whereas 
for Leibniz the change is related to internal activity or passivity. 
	
	
Bayle is in fact arguing that Leibniz’s pre-established harmony 
is not really very different from Malebranche’s and others occasionalism, as 
there would have to be God which guides the substances, that is, intervenes 
to produce the sudden change from pleasure to pain. Surely one cannot 
imagine that these kinds of sudden changes can happen simultaneously in 
the mind and the body if it is supposed that they follow their own laws? This 
is especially true of simple substances such as monads, as they would not 
have parts which would affect other parts in the substance.  
Leibniz’s Letter to the Editor, July 1698    
Leibniz replied in a letter to the editor of the journal Histoire des ouvrages 
des savants in July 1698. He made a distinction between spontaneity and 
voluntariness. Everything voluntary is spontaneous, but there are 
spontaneous actions which are not chosen, and which consequently are not 
voluntary. The states of the soul are always connected to its past states (WF 
81). By this Leibniz means that the past states are present in the soul in the 
form of dispositions, as minute, insensible perceptions (petite perceptions). 
We do not know distinctly the future states of the soul, but there are in each 
soul traces of everything that has happened to it before certain moment in its 
history and traces what will happen to it later (WF 83). Thus the substance’s 
complete notion or substantial form “marks” the soul with tiny traces of its 
complete history. The spiritual machine has in this way a sort of complete 
program written by symbols, which to the agent herself looks like confused 
gibberish. Only its author, God, can interpret the code, hack the message 
(WF 83).   
Because of this cognitive chaos in the soul there has to be an 
external principle in the production of one’s actions. But this is not deus ex 
machina, as Bayle argues, because all the cognitive states of a substance 
	
	
follow from each other naturally (although we do not always notice it). 
There is always a continuity between states of the soul which is due to the 
confused little perceptions which we are not aware of. Because of this there 
are only natural, not miraculous consequences in the soul. We are not 
usually aware of these perceptions because there is an infinite multitude of 
them and we cannot tell them apart (WF 83).  
While Bayle holds that according to occasionalism, God acts 
according to general laws, Leibniz understands the term miracle in the sense 
that it exceeds the power of created things. This makes all of God’s actions 
miraculous, however general they are thought to be (see also Jolley 2013). 
Leibniz thinks that if there is some occasion which is thought to be a general 
law, there must be a simpler or architectonic law of nature for one to avoid 
the charge of God acting miraculously: as an example Leibniz mentions 
gravity (WF 82). Finally, Leibniz comments on the simplicity of a 
substance, emphasizing its complexity. He argues that there are parts in the 
soul, though in itself it is a simple substance. These parts make up the 
affects or feelings of the soul. They are composed of several simultaneous 
perceptions.4 In addition, there is a law of order which exists in perceptions 
as much as in movements; each preceding perception influences succeeding 
ones, as we saw above.  
The perceptions which are simultaneously together in the same 
soul involve a truly infinite multitude of small indistinguishable feelings 
that will be developed in what follows, so one should not be astonished at 
the infinite variety of what emerges over time. All of this is only a 
consequence of the representational nature of the soul, which must express 
what happens, and indeed what will happen, in its body; and, because of the 
connection or correspondence of all the parts of the world, it must also 
	
	
express in some way what happens in all the other substances (WF 84-85). 
Thus each substance not only expresses its own body but through it all the 
other substances as well (WF 85).5  
The Second Edition of Bayle’s Dictionnaire   
We have reached the stage in the discussion where the second edition of 
Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique was finally published in 1702. In 
the note H to the article “Rorarius” he further commented on Leibniz’s 
views. In general, Leibniz’s painstaking efforts at defending his system of 
pre-established harmony have been successful – Bayle is much more 
positively inclined to his views, saying that “I now consider this new system 
to be an important breakthrough, which advances the frontiers of 
philosophy” (Bayle 1702: 2610; WF 86). However, Bayle still does not 
admit that Leibniz’s accusation towards occasionalism being a constant 
miracle is true, and therefore he has no need for Leibniz’s new system of 
pre-established harmony. He also considers the view that substances are 
active in themselves problematic (Bayle 1702: 2610).   
Bayle does not return to the dog -example,6 but presents 
another one concerning the union of soul and body of Caesar, in order to 
argue that the pre-established harmony greatly surpasses the imagination of 
men. If Caesar is given a substantial form or active primitive force which 
includes its whole history, does this notion really cover all the related little 
events during the course of his life without God’s intervention? How can 
this be conceived at all? The problem is even more incomprehensible 
because of the infinite number of organic parts in the human mechanism 
which all are subject to effects of all the other bodies in the world.  
	
	
How can we make sense of the fact that this pre-established 
harmony is never upset, and always stays on course through even the 
longest life of a man, despite the infinite variety of actions of all these parts 
one on another, surrounded on all sides by an infinity of corpuscles, 
sometimes cold, sometimes hot, sometimes dry, sometimes wet, always 
active, always pricking at the nerves, in this way or that? I think that this 
multiplicity of parts and of external agents is essential for the almost infinite 
variety of changes in the human body. But could this variety be as perfectly 
ordered as this system requires? Will it never disturb the correspondence 
between these changes and those of the soul? This is what seems to be quite 
impossible (Bayle 1702: 2611; WF 88). 
When this function of the natural machine is connected to the 
spiritual machine, the picture is even more incredible to Bayle. As Leibniz 
claims, the two machines are both guided by the active force and correspond 
perfectly without any direct co-operation. This is simply not acceptable 
(Bayle 1702: 2611). Bayle proceeds by comparing the soul of Julius Caesar 
(understood as an immaterial automaton) to an epicurean atom which is 
surrounded by a void on all sides, never coming into contact with any other 
atom. According to Bayle, this comparison is very close, as the atom has a 
natural power of self-movement, and the soul of Caesar is a mind which can 
produce its thoughts without any influence from any other mind or body. 
Leibniz had earlier argued that a moving body will always retain its 
movement or progression if nothing occurs to make it change. Similarly the 
atom will keep on moving uniformly and regularly along the same straight 
line (Bayle 1702: 2611).  
	
	
When this idea is applied to the soul of Caesar, we can see that 
if the first thought it gives itself is a feeling of pleasure, it is hard to see why 
the second thought should not be a feeling of pleasure as well. Bayle argues:  
We could never make sense of the possibility of bizarre 
changes from black to white or from yes to no, or those wild 
leaps from earth to heaven which are quite common in human 
thought (Bayle 1702: 2612; WF 91). 
In the second moment of its existence, the soul of Caesar does not acquire a 
new ability to think, but only keeps the ability it had in the first moment, 
being as independent from any external affect as in the first moment (Bayle 
1702: 2611-2622). Thus Bayle still cannot see how in Leibniz’s theory 
sudden changes are possible. If Caesar is suddenly pricked by a pin, how 
can the soul turn from pleasure to pain in a moment without being prepared 
for this sudden change?  
He tries to hammer the point home with yet another example. 
Let us say that God has designed a bird which sings all the time a certain 
score. In order for that to happen, the score has to be imprinted in the 
memory of the animal or its muscles are arranged in such a way that 
mechanical movement produce that score. When this analogy is applied to 
man’s soul, it is not enough, according to Leibniz, that the soul is able to 
give itself new thoughts, but also that it follows a certain sequence in its 
thoughts which correspond to the continual change in the body-machine. It 
does not seem believable that the soul cannot foresee the following states or 
the musical score it will experience in the future. But this is what Leibniz 
claims, as he holds that the soul senses the future perceptions only 
confusedly (Bayle 1702: 2512). 
	
	
Leibniz’s Last Reply 
Leibniz’s public last word was published in Histoire critique de la 
république des lettres in 1716, ten years after Bayle had died. To Bayle’s 
argument that from pleasure there necessarily follows more pleasure, 
Leibniz argues that if we could predict the future states of the series of a 
substance, we could build a perfect robot (WF 109). Leibniz’s final word is 
that even if the ideas of man are dispositional in the sense that they arise 
from previous ones, due to confusedness we cannot predict the future states 
and therefore they can be totally opposite to preceding states. Only God, 
whose cognition is infinite can analyse the complete history of the 
substances. In fact, that is the reason we exist in the first place, as God has 
chosen this set of substances to create. And the creation includes the idea 
that the substances are compatible; that is they harmonize with each other. 
Leibniz is ready to admit that with respect to bodies, his theory is 
mechanical, but with respect to soul, it is nothing like that.  
So according to this second half of my theory, everything 
happens in the soul as if there were no body; just as, according to the first 
half, everything happens in the body as if there were no soul (WF 113). 
Therefore even if the soul represents the states of the attached body, it acts 
independently of it. Concerning the soul of Caesar and the question of 
sudden change, Leibniz argues that there is a great variety in the soul, unlike 
in an atom. Although like the atom, the soul is indivisible, it contains  
A compound tendency, that is to say a multitude of present 
thoughts, each of which tends towards a particular change, 
depending on what is involved in it, and which are all in it at 
the same time, in virtue of its essential relatedness to all the 
other things in the world (WF 115).  
	
	
The change from pleasure to pain may look sudden, but in addition to the 
continuous series of intermediate petite perceptions discussed above, there 
are a great number of different inclinations present at the same time in the 
soul, and the difference between the pleasure and pain is not as great as one 
might think. Leibniz argues: “So we need not be surprised by this change; it 
sometimes seems that pleasure is only a complex of small perceptions, each 
of which, if it were large, would be pain” (WF 116). Therefore the balance 
between pleasure and pain is very delicate.7  
Leibniz’s Unpublished Comments and Notes (1705) 
It is easy to see from the above that the communication between Bayle and 
Leibniz ended unresolved. Bayle was still confused about the question of 
sudden change, and, while accepting Leibniz’s pre-established system as an 
alternative solution to occasionalism, he still supported the latter.     
However, there is a lot of interesting material preserved by 
Leibniz which did not end up in the communication and which sheds light to 
the topics. Let us first see Leibniz’s unpublished comments and notes to the 
second edition of the Dictionnaire. In the comments Leibniz returns to the 
example of the dog. He says that the pre-established harmony means that 
pain comes into a dog’s soul when its body is hit. If it is not hit, there is no 
mental event in the dog’s soul related to that physical event, as God would 
have seen the event through his foreknowledge. Therefore the law-of-the-
series of the dog’s soul is perfectly synchronized to that of the aggregate 
that is its body. Bayle’s problem, as Leibniz sees it, is that he cannot see 
how the sudden change takes place without God causing it directly, as in 
occasionalism (through particular laws). In other words, Bayle fails to grasp 
the consequences of the pre-established harmony (GP IV 530). It is also 
important to see that the change is not sudden as it seems:        
	
	
The causes which move the stick (that is, the man stationed 
behind the dog, getting ready to hit it while it eats, and 
everything in the history of the material world which 
contributes to his being in that position), are also represented 
in the dog’s soul from the outset, exactly and truly, but feebly, 
by small confused perceptions and without apperception, that 
is, without the dog's knowing it − because the dog's body also 
is affected by them only imperceptibly. And just as in the 
history of the material world these dispositions eventually 
produce the blow firmly on the dog's body, so similarly the 
representations of these dispositions in the dog's soul 
eventually produce the representation of the blow of the stick; 
and since that representation is prominent and strong, the dog 
apperceives it very distinctly, and this is what constitutes its 
pain. So we don't have to imagine that in this encounter the 
dog's soul passes from pleasure to pain arbitrarily, and without 
any internal reason. (GP IV 531-532; WF 77). 
So in the dog’s soul there is a feeble disposition of getting hit by a stick; 
when this happens the obscure little unconscious perceptions or petite 
perceptions become more clear and when this development is heightened to 
its ultimate degree (the dog experiences the full effect of the hit), the dog 
perceives the pain distinctly. Because the hit of a stick received by the dog 
is only a disposition, the dog cannot know the future pain:  
The principle of change is in the dog, the disposition of its soul 
moves imperceptibly toward giving it pain − but this is without its knowing, 
and without its wanting it. The representation of the present state of the 
universe in the dog's soul produces in it the representation of the subsequent 
	
	
state of the same universe; just as in the things represented, the preceding 
state actually produces the subsequent state of the world. In a soul, the 
representations of causes are the causes of the representations of effects. 
And since this subsequent state of the world includes the blow on the dog's 
body, the representation of that subsequent state in its soul includes the pain 
which corresponds to that blow (WF 77).  
When the dog is hit, the soul represents the cause (the hit) and 
the effect (pain). But before the first event and between these two events 
there are many intermediate insensible little perceptions. The soul of the dog 
is imperceptibly on its way to pain, but it is not aware of it. Only when the 
blow takes place, the soul feels the pain (“subsequent state of the world”) 
which has encountered its body due to pre-established harmony. In another 
unpublished note of 1705 we can find a similar case:  
The soul sometimes passes from white to black or from yes to 
no, without knowing how, or at least involuntarily, for what its 
confused thoughts and its feelings produce in it we attribute to 
the body. So we should not be surprised if a man who is stung 
by some insect when eating jam should, despite himself, pass 
immediately from pleasure to pain. For, in approaching the 
man’s body before stinging it, this insect was already affecting 
it, and the representation of this was, albeit unconsciously, 
already affecting his soul (WF 103). 
Here a felt pleasure changes to pain suddenly, but again Leibniz emphasizes 
the great role of unconscious little perceptions in one’s mental life:  
In the soul as in the body, little by little the insensible becomes 
the sensible…nothing new happens in the substance of the 
	
	
soul which makes it feel the sting; for what happens is 
confused presentiment, or, better, insensible dispositions of the 
soul, which represent the dispositions of the body with regard 
to the sting (WF 103).  
Therefore the events of hitting the dog or stinging the jam-eating man are 
processes of which only some stages are perceived distinctly. I think 
Leibniz’s explanations are satisfying in terms of understanding the sudden 
change, but it is also easy to agree with Rutherford that the dog is acting 
here as a patient rather than an agent and that it would not spontaneously 
move from pleasure to pain (Rutherford 2005: 171-172; Rutherford 2015: 
204).8 The same holds true in the example of the jam-eating man. I think 
this fact cannot be resolved, but it can be understood – there are unfortunate 
events in the world and they are part and parcel of the history of the beings, 
evident to a supreme being who can analyse the law-of-the-series of the 
substances, but unpredictable to the substances themselves.  
Some Reflections on the Outcome of the Controversy 
The correspondence with Bayle is essential in understanding Leibniz’s 
mature views of the soul and the psychophysical parallelism. Unlike many 
other critics, Bayle understood Leibniz’s views fairly well and was 
sympathetic to them. Thus it is certain that the controversy was conducted 
under a spirit of tolerance which, according to Marcelo Dascal, is the first 
component of a positive attitude toward human difference (Dascal 2010: 
27).     
Bayle considered Leibniz’s pre-established harmony as a 
viable alternative to his preferred system of occasionalism, but this is not to 
say that he would probably have been persuaded to adopt it. As we have 
	
	
seen, there remained the problem of the nature of God’s action on the world 
which the philosophers could not agree on. Bayle’s criticism well represents 
the reactions to Leibniz’s idea of pre-established harmony. Most thought of 
it as an interesting hypothesis which was very much estranged from reality.  
It is certainly true that Leibniz could not demonstrate his 
hypothesis any more than Malebranche or other occasionalists could theirs. 
In this sense his pre-established harmony is not an improvement to 
Malebranche. In fact, to contemporaries it might have been more believable 
to think that God connects all things in the world from moment to moment 
(through laws of nature) than that he has created the substances in such a 
way that they perfectly correspond with each other from the start until the 
end of the world. In the eyes of the learned reading public, it seems probable 
that Bayle was the winner of the controversy. Be that as it may, the victory 
of occasionalism was not to last long – when Leibniz’s Theodicy became 
fashionable in the first half of the eighteenth century, the supporters of 
occasionalism were few.     
The case may be different with respect to spontaneity. Leibniz 
struggled to show to Bayle that the soul functions largely in terms of 
insensible petite perceptions and that the continuity of events is founded on 
them. But he had not yet published his New Essays at this point where he 
would explain their significance in detail. Leibniz discusses “small 
indistinguishable feelings” in his reply, but does not really explain their 
importance in his doctrine of the mind. Bayle was probably not aware of the 
systematic value of Leibniz’s doctrine at all, as the insensible perceptions 
were implicitly mentioned only in his 1684 article Meditationes de 
cognitione, veritate et ideis, and the systematic presentation in NE was not 
published until 1765. This conjecture is supported by the fact that Bayle 
	
	
does not comment on the little perceptions in the correspondence at all – 
perhaps he took Leibniz’s view as metaphorical. For him it may have looked 
as unintelligible as the hypothesis of pre-established harmony. One would 
suspect that if Leibniz had sent Bayle drafts of the New Essays (even the 
Preface), Bayle would have taken the doctrine more seriously.   
In fact, I think that the New Essays is essential in 
understanding the communication between Bayle and Leibniz and that this 
has not been properly acknowledged.9 There are a number of common 
topics between the two sources, and many of them are discussed more 
extensively in NE. I will here mention only one example.    
In NE II, xx, §6 Leibniz discusses passions in the context of 
Lockean concept of uneasiness; he argues that pleasure can be divided to 
minute semi-pleasures and only when they accumulate we can have the 
genuine pleasure. The same is true for pain – as Leibniz explained to Bayle, 
the pain the dog experiences is not a sudden change in metaphysical respect. 
It is a development of minute semi-sufferings which, put together, create the 
feeling of pain which the dog perceives. Although the process takes place in 
split seconds, it nonetheless is gradual. In his reply to Bayle in 1698 Leibniz 
already anticipated this view in NE, but his description of it is shallower and 
he does not use the terms semi-pleasure or semi-suffering of NE. One might 
suspect that Leibniz is here answering to both Locke (for whom passions are 
overwhelming states of unease which are difficult to resist) and Bayle – he 
wrote New Essays around the same time as the comments and notes to the 
second edition of Dictionnaire.  
However, in NE he presents a theme not to be found in the 
communication. The process of minute semi-sufferings which starts when 
the stinging bee approaches the jam-eating man leads to a feeling of 
	
	
imperfection or mental pain in the man when the bee stings him. The pain 
can be divided into innumerable semi-sufferings, and Leibniz argues that we 
can fight against the pain by replacing the semi-sufferings eventually with 
semi-pleasures. The direction of the affective process changes slowly, 
leading back to pleasure again. Therefore even though the man has 
experienced an unexpected and involuntary setback, he can systematically 
continue striving toward the good through semi-pleasures which will 
eventually accumulate to genuine pleasure (A VI 6 165). The mind is able to 
dig its own sources, with its appetite toward the good, and eventually 
experiences joy again (see also Rutherford 2015: 217-218). In this way the 
soul can evolve from imperfection to perfection, or in emotional terms, from 
harmful passions to intellectual emotions of joy, hope and love (for details, 
see Roinila 2012).   
This discussion reflects the fact that Bayle is not really 
interested in Leibniz’s complex theory of mind and its dynamics, due to the 
fact that he prefers occasionalism to the Leibnizian idea of a system of 
active substances. For him, the mind represents the external senses and the 
problem consists only of the uniform response to outer effects in the pre-
established harmony. But for Leibniz, there are an infinite number of little, 
unconscious perceptions from the senses present at all times in the soul and 
they form “appetitions”, imperceptible inclinations toward pleasure or pain 
which may conflict with each other. In addition to these inclinations in the 
soul which arise from the perceptions of the external senses, there is the 
internal appetite or endeavour toward the good (NE II, xxi, §5). So it seems 
to me that by his repeated observations on the infinite complexity of the 
mind Leibniz is really trying to explain to Bayle that while the mind does 
represent the states of the body, their effect on the mind is not as simple as 
	
	
he thinks. This view is much more prominent in NE than in the 
communication. 
As Leibniz’s last extensive reply remained unpublished until 
ten years after Bayle’s death, we can never know how the debate would 
have ended. One could speculate that at some point Leibniz could have 
given parts of his New Essays for Bayle to read and this would probably 
have greatly helped the discussion, as Bayle was also aware of Locke’s 
thoughts and would perhaps have agreed with some of Leibniz’s criticisms 
against them. In this way the conflict could have been converted to co-
operation, although the topics of the controversy would perhaps have 
changed in the process. But I suspect Leibniz would not have been prepared 
to do this after Locke’s death in 1704, as he decided to suppress the 
publication of NE. Sharing its contents would inevitably have led to 
exposure of the project, which would have been against his resolution to 
abandon it.  
On the other hand, Leibniz was keen to win Bayle’s support – 
in NE he frequently boasts of Bayle’s acceptance of his hypothesis of pre-
established harmony − but he was not prepared to give up any of his views. 
He had been opposing occasionalism for a long time due to arguments 
presented above. But I think one can say that both not only tolerated each 
other, they also understood each other in the sense that they were aware of 





1 When discussing the New System, I will refer to the post-publication revised version in 
GP IV 477-87 and the English translation in Leibniz 1997 (WF 10-20). 
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
2 Leibniz published his theory of forces in an article called Specimen dynamicum (part 1 
appeared in Acta eruditorum, 1695).  
3 A selection of the documents concerning the discussion following the publication of the 
New System is conveniently translated to English in WF.  
4 Here Leibniz anticipates his view in New Essays II, xx, §6 as I will argue later. 
5 This idea is quite Spinozistic. Compare Ethics 2p17.  
6 I will return to the example later. 
7 In New Essays (II, xx, §7) Leibniz argued that we can be cheerful when we are being 
tortured and feel depressed when we are having fun (A VI 6 166). 
8 However, in another comment of 1705 Leibniz says that he does not think the soul gives 
itself its first feelings. They are received with its existence from God at the moment of 
creation and from the first feelings all the others follow (WF 102). Leibniz agrees here with 
his early view in De Affectibus (1679) where he, influenced by Hobbes, argued that affects 
follow from each other. Change in the series takes place only when a greater apparent 
perfection is encountered. See Roinila 2015.  
9 A notable exception is Bolton 2013. 
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